An Account of Prorogation Similar in Principle


I see that my ideas on both prorogation and the constitutional relationship between the First Minister and Governor have taken hold in a wider academic audience, as Dr. Radha Persaud has shown in his column, “Prorogation: A Matter of Restraint.”

I could almost have written it myself.

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Posted in Crown (Powers and Office), Prorogation | Leave a comment

The Wrong Way to Limit a Premier’s Power to Prorogue: Why Catherine Fife’s Bill Is Unconstitutional


Dalton McGuinty

Premier McGuinty pensively plots his pernicious prorogation.

My column appears in iPolitics under the title, “The Wrong Way to Limit a Premier’s Power to Prorogue.” I am grateful to Doug Beazley for having published it in the “Insight” section.

The controversial prorogation of former Liberal Premier Dalton McGuinty lasted from 15 October 2012 to 19 February 2013. With the legislature back in session, the political backlash to this political tactic has just begun.

On 5 March 2013, New Democratic MPP Catherine Fife introduced a private members’ bill that would amend the Legislative Assembly Act so that the Premier could no longer exercise the judgement and discretion when to advise the Lieutenant Governor to summon and prorogue the legislature. Instead, the Premier could only offer this constitutional advice after “the Legislature has adopted a resolution in support of the prorogation.”

The bill would also require that “the Premier shall also advise the Lieutenant Governor to summon the Legislature in accordance with the recommendation of the Assembly.” The Legislative Assembly would de facto prorogue and summon itself, and the Premier would no longer be able take responsibility the act of the Crown for prorogation.

Despite the bill’s assertion that “nothing alters or abridges the powers of the Crown, including the power to prorogue, dissolve or summon the Legislature,” all the preceding sections would alter and abridge the power to summon and prorogue the legislature.

This bill would be unconstitutional because only an amendment under section 41(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982 can change anything “in relation to the office of the Lieutenant Governor of a province.”

The Lieutenant Governor’s powers to summon (and, implicitly, to prorogue) the legislature come directly from section 82 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 5 of the Constitution Act, 1982 further requires that the Legislature sit at least once per year, which puts the maximum theoretical duration of a prorogation at 364 days. The Legislative Assembly Act affirms those powers as part of the Constitution of Ontario.

The Constitution of Ontario includes both the Lieutenant Governor’s written constitutional power to summon and prorogue and the uncodified conventions of Responsible Government that Ministers of the Crown take responsibility for all acts of the Crown and that the Lieutenant Governor acts on and in accordance with the Premier’s advice in summoning and proroguing the legislature. Fife’s bill even acknowledges that the Premier alone advises the Lieutenant Governor to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the legislature.

This bill would limit how the Premier can exercise the discretion to advise and take responsibility for summoning and prorogation and therefore necessarily limit how the Lieutenant Governor promulgates that advice. The legislature cannot drive a wedge between the Governor and First Minister of the Crown without a constitutional amendment.

However, the Legislature could pass a bill that better defines prorogation, provided that it also preserves the respective constitutional roles of the Premier and Lieutenant Governor. The Government would only have to advise the Lieutenant Governor to give the bill Crown Consent (if the provincial legislatures, like the Parliament of Canada, also recognize this procedure).

First, the Legislature could define “prorogation” and “intersession” in statute without infringing upon the power itself. The Legislative Assembly Act currently states, “It is not necessary for the Lieutenant Governor in proroguing the Legislature to name a day to which it is prorogued.”

The Legislature could amend that law such that the Lieutenant Governor issues two proclamations (on and in accordance with the Premier’s advice): the first would prorogue the legislature and the second would summon the next session for despatch of business at, say, intervals of 40 days. The Premier could only advise the Lieutenant Governor to extend the intersession through another 40 days through a subsequent proclamation. Such an amendment would bring Ontario in line with the federal convention on prorogation.

Second, the legislature could also amend the Financial Administration Act in order restrict Special Warrants to periods of 60 days and only when parliament is dissolved. The federal parliament adopted such a reform in the 1990s. Special Warrants give the Government an emergency power to implement spending without first obtaining parliamentary authorization, which directly contradicts the historical and modern purpose of parliament. The current legislation allows the Lieutenant Governor to issue Special Warrants on and in accordance with the advice of the Government “if the legislature is not in session,” which includes both the intersessions when parliament is prorogued and the writ when parliament is dissolved.

Special Warrants are a pure statutory power and pertain neither to the written constitution nor to constitutional conventions. MPPs could simply amend section 1.0.7(1) of the Financial Administration Act to read “If the legislature is dissolved” without raising any constitutional questions. By restricting the Special Warrants to the writ, the legislature would place an indirect but practical and important limit on the duration of a prorogation. Whenever the Government ran out of money during an intersession, Parliament would have to be recalled in order to approve any additional spending.

NDP leader Andrea Horwath has touted this bill as “taking the politics out of prorogation.” In reality, this bill would inject even more politics into every subsequent prorogation – particularly in a minority parliament – and would be unconstitutional. Thankfully, the Legislature could amend the bill at committee so that it both promotes the same principle of better defining prorogation and conforms to the constitution.

James W.J. Bowden is an M.A. Candidate at the University of Ottawa.

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“Prime Minister of Ontario”: The Old Title of Leslie Frost and John Robarts


Leslie Frost, Prime Minister of Ontario, commemorates a building in downtown Toronto

Leslie Frost, Prime Minister of Ontario, commemorates a building in downtown Toronto

In the English language, three titles within Commonwealth Realms refer to the same office of head of government: “first minister,” “premier,” and “prime minister.”  One of my correspondents informed me of a fourth title found within the Commonwealth of Nations: the heads of government in the several Indian states go by “Chief Minister,” while the head of government of the Republic of India goes by the conventional “Prime Minister.” The same goes for the heads of government of the United Kingdom,  New Zealand, and Canada and Australia at the federal level. The heads of government of the Canadian provinces and Australian states are referred to as “premiers”, probably in order to distinguish them from each country’s federal prime minister.  The heads of the governments of the devolved jurisdictions within the United Kingdom – Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland – became “First Minister,” probably to differentiate them from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. (I often use “First Minister” as a convenient generic label that would cover both provincial and federal heads of government in Canada and Australia).

In contrast, the French language only includes one title that covers all four of its English equivalents, premier ministre. Unfortunately, the most bizarre form of pedantic antipathy that English-speaking Canadians sometimes show toward Quebec is the critique that Quebeckers refer to their premier as “prime minister,” as if to elevate the province to the equivalent of a fully sovereign state. I’ve heard this nonsensical assertion on many occasions, and I’m sure that many you have as well. Worse still, some English-speaking scholars, like Sujit Choudhry, have even promoted this bizarre claim:

Quebec’s political elites have long referred to the province, its institutions, its symbols and its collective goals in national terms. The provincial legislature is the National Assembly, its head of government the Prime Minister as opposed to a mere Premier […].[1]

In the French language, the title premier ministre applies to all 10 premiers in Canada, not just to the premier of Quebec, because of a fundamental fact of the French language that has nothing to do with nationalist or secessionist politics in Quebec. The “Premier of Ontario” is le premier ministre de l’Ontario – and no one would suggest that this French-language title would amount to an aggrandizement of the office.

Leslie Frost, Prime Minister of Ontario, commemorates the Tory Building

Leslie Frost, Prime Minister of Ontario, commemorates the Tory Building on 15 October 1957.

 

Ironically, however, the use of “Prime Minister of Ontario” in English does propagate a political statement and seeks to elevate Ontario to the level of Canada. Leslie Frost served as the 16th Premier of Ontario from 4 May 1949 to 8 November 1961 – but he referred to himself as “Prime Minister of Ontario” rather than as “Premier of Ontario.” As the two photos in this blog entry show, several plaques on buildings that he commemorated have etched this title in stone. I found the first in downtown Toronto, and the other comes from the Tory Building at Carleton University. Frost’s moniker built on another precedent of self-aggrandizement: Ontario also dubbed its provincial legislature the “Provincial Parliament” and “Members of Provincial Parliament” in 1938. [4]

Frost reportedly enjoyed good relations with both Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Diefenbaker, so he probably did not adopt the title “Prime Minister of Ontario” in order to anger or challenge the federal level. [2] Canadian political scientist Rand Dyck concludes that Frost’s premiership “was characterized by […] a lack of concern with provincial status.” [3] (Perhaps Frost merely concerned himself with his own personal status!)

john-robarts-prime-minister-of-ontario

John Robarts also preferred the title “Prime Minister of Ontario,” as his address to the Law Society of Upper Canada in 1970 shows. But the last long-tenured premier of the post-war Progressive Conservative dynasty, Bill Davis, switched the title to “Premier of Ontario”, where it has remained since. Perhaps “Prime Minister of Ontario” sounds self-aggrandizing, but the first minister possesses the prerogative power to alter his own title.

*Update: 2016-06-28: I thank Pierre Allard for having taken an interest in this old entry and for having informed me that it was Davis who changed the title.

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[1] Sujit Choudhry, “Bills of Rights as Instruments of Nation-Building in Multinational States: The Canadian Charter and Quebec Nationalism”, University of Toronto Legal Studies Series, Research Paper 1006905 (August 2007): 1.
[2] Rand Dyck, Ontario Government and Politics. (Ottawa: Carleton University Graphic Services, 2009): 36.
[3] Rand Dyck, Ontario Government and Politics. (Ottawa: Carleton University Graphic Services, 2009): 37.
[4] Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada: Toward the Turn of the Century. 3rd Ed. (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1996), 327.

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David Onley Defends Responsible Government


Introduction

David Onley leads the procession before reading the Speech from the Throne.

David Onley leads the procession before reading the Speech from the Throne. (I didn’t know that the distance between the Government and Opposition benches was so wide!)

I’d like to thank David Watson of the Ottawa Citizen for having published my and Nick MacDonald’s column, “Onley Provides Much Needed Education.” It follows up on our earlier column from October 2012, “McGuinty Had Every Right to Prorogue,” and shows how the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario, His Honour David Onley, has explained and promoted Responsible Government during the intersession of McGuinty’s prorogation (15 October 2012 to 19 February 2013).

Why Governors Should Not Issue Written Explanations or Rationales Behind Acts of the Crown like Prorogation or Dissolution

David Onley has taken a unique and noteworthy approach and established a new model that the other Governors in Canada should consider adopting. In January, Professors Dodek and Sossin argued that Onley has established a new model but that he also broke convention by “justif[ying] his controversial decision in some detail.” They added,

We believe — as apparently Onley does — that when a viceregal representative exercises the rare discretion to prorogue the legislature he or she should explain the decision to the public.

I disagree with those statements. First, prorogation occurs every two years or so in Ontario, so it’s not particularly rare. Second, McGuinty’s prorogation of 2012 – including the unspecified duration of the intersession – conformed to the norm in Ontario and to the standard practice under Premiers Rae, Harris, and Eves. In addition, the legislature met more frequently and for a greater number of sitting days under the McGuinty government than under either the Rae or Harris governments. Third, the Governors do not possess the discretion to reject advice to prorogue, and Onley did not exercise any discretionary authority in this instance. Fourth, while Onley has established a new approach and implemented a new and successful media strategy, he did not explain the rationale behind McGuinty’s political decision to prorogue, and he did not break the convention of confidentiality between the governor and first minister. McGuinty explained the rationale and the political decision to prorogue the 1st session of the 40th Legislature. Onley merely explained the constitutional position on prorogation and the general constitutional relationship between the premier and first minister; more crucially, Onley did not divulge the contents of a particular consultation. This is an important distinction.

Responsible Government means that Ministers of the Crown take responsibility for all acts of the Crown (including government bills, supply bills, and all executive policy decisions), and that the Lieutenant Governor acts on and in accordance with ministerial advice. Government Ministers must also defend the political neutrality of the Lieutenant Governor by assuming the political responsibility for their executive decisions, because the Lieutenant Governor cannot advocate on behalf of himself without undermining his Ministers. Responsible Government also means that the First Minister must maintain the confidence of the Governor, as well as the more commonly stated and better known principle that the Government must maintain the confidence of the lower house. The Governor expresses that confidence in the First Minister by granting him a commission of authority to govern under the Crown and by acting on and in accordance with his advice. The Governor would revoke his confidence in the First Minister and Government, under exceptional circumstances, by refusing to promulgate or acting contrary to their advice – which in turn forces either the dismissal or resignation of the Ministry. This exceptional consequence is precisely why the Governor may only act contrary to ministerial advice under exceptional circumstances. The Governor’s discretionary authority to reject ministerial advice under exceptional circumstances (the “reserve power”) truly is the nuclear deterrent of Responsible Government, though most scholars since Bourinot and Dawson have not properly acknowledged why.

Responsible Government therefore requires that the consultations between the Premier and Governor remain confidential. This confidentiality does not require the strict “Sphinx-like silence” that Dodek and Sossin highlighted – it only means that neither the Premier nor the Governor may divulge the content of their consultations. The First Minister can and should explain the rationale behind his political decision, and the Governor may explain his role under Responsible Government.

However, under no circumstances should the Governor explain the rationale behind acts of the Crown or issue written reasons, because this arrangement would undermine Responsible Government. If the Governor breaks the confidentiality of his consultations with the First Minister, he would undermine the position of the First Minister and indirectly revoke his commission of authority under the Crown to govern. This would probably lead to the dismissal or resignation of the incumbent government. This entire idea derives from the worst precedent in the core Commonwealth: in Australia, Governor General Sir John Kerr dismissed Prime Minister Gough Whitlam on 11 November 1975 and appointed the Opposition Leader Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister later that afternoon because the Liberal majority in the Senate blocked the the budget of Whitlam’s majority Labor Government. (Worse still, the Whitlam government undoubtedly commanded the confidence of the House of Representatives). Kerr issued four pages of reasons why he dismissed Whitlam; by accepting Kerr’s commission to form a new government, Fraser thereby accepted Whitlam’s dismissal and the rationale behind it, and then immediately advised a double dissolution in order to break the deadlock between the two houses. This example shows how the Governor cannot issue written reasons without necessarily undermining the incumbent First Minister and Government.

The First Minister – not the Governor – should issue explanations, which is what McGuinty did, even though he couched his rationale in the obfuscation of the standard Orwellian political rhetoric. As Nick and I explain in the column, McGuinty’s inadequate explanation is a political issue, not a constitutional one. That said, the inadequacy of McGuinty’s explanation indirectly exposes the true political, tactical reasons behind his decision.

I’ve also posted the unabridged version of the column below.

David Onley Promotes Responsible Government

Bowden & MacDonald, "Ottawa Citizen, Onley Provides Much Needed Education"

Bowden & MacDonald, “Ottawa Citizen, Onley Provides Much Needed Education”

The Speech from the Throne of 19 February 2013 officially ended David McGuinty’s prorogation, started the 2nd session of the 40th Legislature of Ontario, and introduced the agenda of Kathleen Wynne’s government. Constitutional events have now come full circle since 15 October 2012, when Dalton McGuinty announced his intention to resign as both Liberal leader and Premier of Ontario, while also proroguing the legislature to an unspecified date.

In an interview with Steve Paikin from 23 October 2012, McGuinty explained that the prorogation provided a “cooling off period” from an overly partisan environment, and that he had decided to “blow the whistle” because the legislature was no longer functioning “in the public interest.” But McGuinty divulged too much and needlessly dragged the Lieutenant Governor into a political debate; in so doing, he undermined David C. Onley’s position by commenting that Onley had asked “no questions” about the prorogation. Normally, the first minister refuses to discuss the contents of his consultations with the governor; McGuinty should have followed suit.

In fairness, McGuinty also explained in a press conference on October 24 that only the Premier makes and takes responsibility for the political decision to prorogue. McGuinty may have prorogued in order to postpone embarrassing debates on the cancellation of gas plants and accommodate the Liberal leadership election and the mid-parliamentary change of government; his critics have found his official explanations wanting, but this is a political matter, not a constitutional one.

Responsible Government, the bedrock of Canada’s and Ontario’s system of government, means that Ministers of the Crown take responsibility for all acts of the Crown; this includes government bills, supply bills, and all executive policy decisions – as well as requests to prorogue. Accordingly, the lieutenant governor acts on and in accordance with ministerial advice.

As such, it is incumbent on government ministers to defend the political neutrality of the lieutenant governor by assuming the political responsibility for their executive decisions, because the lieutenant governor cannot advocate on behalf of himself without undermining his ministers.

Based on McGuinty’s description of his consultations with Onley, a major Toronto daily unflatteringly referred to the Lieutenant Governor as “pliant and incurious.”  This assessment presumes a political expectation that the Lieutenant Governor makes the political decision to prorogue and exercises political judgement on the matter. But the Lieutenant Governor does not possess the discretion to reject advice to prorogue.

Following intense fallout from the media and the public’s misunderstanding of his position, Onley gave an interview with the Toronto Star on 13 January 2013 where stated, “The premier, not the lieutenant-governor, is responsible for the decisions.” Drawing on Bagehot’s famous trio of rights, he added that all the Lieutenant Governor may do on his “own initiative is advise and warn” ministers. But Onley did not explain the rationale behind the decision to prorogue. Instead, he explained the basis on which all of his decisions are made when being advised by the government. Only McGuinty has thus far explained the rationale behind his own decision to prorogue.

Onley added, “There never has been a case where prorogation has been denied.” If the Governor refuses to act on the Premier’s advice, he forces the resignation of the Government precisely because it cannot take responsibility for an executive decision that contradicts the advice tendered. This exceptional consequence of dismissal or resignation shows why the Governor may only reject some types of ministerial advice under exceptional circumstances. In the same interview, Onley explained, “something ‘politically controversial’ doesn’t fit that category” of the exceptional circumstances on which he could ever refuse a premier’s advice, since rejecting such advice would amount to a dismissal of the government. In sum, McGuinty had every right to advise and receive prorogation. Onley affirmed, “It’s up to the politicians to work out the political process, the political decision-making that is behind prorogation — and the fallout after prorogation.”

While the media may not have been aware of these principles, the Lieutenant Governor’s Office has since tried to fill this knowledge gap by clarifying the public’s expectations of his role.

Through a series of informative and accessible press releases and backgrounders on the transition between the McGuinty and Wynne governments, the lieutenant governor’s media strategy has helped correct some misconceptions of his constitutional role, while still maintaining the confidentiality of his consultations with the Premier. This information contributed greatly to accurate media reporting of these constitutional events.

The Liberal Party of Ontario elected Kathleen Wynne as its new leader on 26 January. Onley then acknowledged Wynne as Premier-designate on 31 January and commissioned her to form a new Government. On 11 February, McGuinty formally resigned as Premier, and Onley swore in Wynne and her Cabinet as the 25th Ministry of Ontario that same afternoon. Onley then opened the new session on 19 February.

In his address which follows the swearing in of Ontario’s 25th ministry, Onley spoke briefly to his new government, enunciating the principles of responsible government. He explained to his new advisers that they “will advise [him] on the exercise of [his] constitutional duties and legal authorities” and that they are and remain “accountable for that advice to this Assembly—and through the MPPs—to the people of Ontario.”

The tradition of strict silence on the part of the governor has not always serve the office well, particularly in an intense media environment where constitutional conventions are not well-understood and where expectations on where to find information has shifted. But conventions evolve, and Ontario’s lieutenant governor has risen to the challenge. David Onley has established a new model of vice-regal accessibility in Ontario that includes an updated and expanded website, a strong presence on Facebook and Twitter, and issuing timely and informative press releases on his constitutional role – all while faithfully explaining and reinforcing that in our system of government, where ministers of the Crown take responsibility for all acts of the Crown.

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Succession Falls Under the “Office of Queen”


This brief syllogism explains why succession to the Crown of Canada falls under the “office of Queen” of s.41(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

1. The Crown is as corporation sole.

The Supreme Court of Canada: “The Crown is technically a corporation sole, and is of course in the legal sense a person capable of being a subject of rights and duties.”

The Law Commission of the United Kingdom: “Corporation sole – a corporation consisting of one person and his or her successors in a particular office or station. Examples include the Crown, government ministers, and bishops.”

2. A corporation sole, by definition, includes the successors to that office.

The Law Commission of the United Kingdom: “A corporation sole consists of one person and his or her successors in some particular office or station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them certain legal capacities and advantages which they would not have in their natural person. Unlike a corporation aggregate, a corporation sole has a dual capacity, namely its corporate capacity, and its individual or natural capacity.”

The Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan: “a ‘corporation sole’ is an unusual type of corporation consisting of only one person and his successors in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages. In this sense the sovereign in England is a sole corporation – so is a bishop.”

3. Therefore, succession pertains directly to the “office of Queen” of s.41(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and forms part of the Constitution of Canada. (The Crowns of the United Kingdom and Canada are separate corporations sole and legal persons vested in the same natural person).

4. Only a constitutional amendment can thus alter succession to the Crown of Canada.

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