
Conflating the Caretaker Convention with The Doctrine of Necessity
I remain transfixed by the spectacle unfolding in Newfoundland and Labrador and will have to report back once Elections Newfoundland and Labrador counts the ballots cast in this illegitimate election.
Last week, Ed Hollett, a political historian based in St. John’s, accused me and Lyle Skinner of construing the Elections Act of Newfoundland and Labrador too narrowly. “You need to look at the Act again as a whole document, not just a list of rules. I think there’s an element of that limited approach in Bowden’s commentary as well,” he insisted. By “limited,” he means “factually correct,” because the words in statutes must mean something. “Looking at an act as a whole” does not substitute for the absence of specific provisions that would need to exist in order for your argument to be true.
Whenever someone accuses you of interpreting a statute too narrowly, or something to that effect, it means that he is about to propose something that the statute clearly prohibits or does not support or simply does not contain at all. A statute is not greater than the sum of its parts, and you cannot magically derive statutory authority where no statutory provision exists. I awaited Hollett’s full counter-argument with eager anticipation and became greatly disappointed upon reading it.[1] The closest that he comes to shedding new insight into statutory interpretation in general and the Elections Act in particular occurs in this observation:
Continue reading →