The Ceremonial and Protocol Handbook by the Department of Canadian Heritage


A Review of the Contents

The Department of Canadian Heritage (PCH) created the Ceremonial and Protocol Handbook in the 1990s as a semi-official reference for use within the Government of Canada. I obtained the document through an ATIP to PCH; you can download it complete and unabridged as a PDF from the above hyperlink. Judging from some of the references in this edition, PCH compiled it circa 1998, though some of the material has been updated as recently as 2010. (The Handbook appears to be a completed and more thorough version of PCH’s website on “Protocol” and a document called “Ceremonial Procedures,” from the Department of Public Works).

The handbook contains eleven chapters and covers the following topics, providing historical background and descriptions of current practice of Canada and all ten provinces:

  • Organization of events;
  • Canadian emblems;
  • Heraldry;
  • Holidays;
  • Orders, Decorations, and Medals;
  • The Royal Family;
  • The Governor General;
  • Prime Ministers;
  • Lieutenant Governors; and
  • Other provincial matters.

The Handbook contains the Order of Precedence for the Government of Canada, as well as those of all the provinces and of the Yukon Territory. It also describes the correct manner of address for members of the Royal Family, a list of all Royal Visits since 1952, and how the Government of Canada plans such visits.

Guidelines Open to Evolution

The authors describe this Handbook as unofficial and affirmed that “There is no official manual of protocol or ceremonial published by the government of Canada.” They added, “Protocol, by definition, has to be flexible and adapt to the various actors on the political or social stage.”[1] In light of this declared purpose, this handbook could perhaps be more accurately referred to as guidelines, which may in turn be designed to transfer knowledge between practitioners and within the Government of Canada. However, this guide would not necessarily prevent changes in procedures from occurring: guidelines are not laws; they would retain the possibility of innovation and evolution of protocol over time and where necessary. Protocol for unprecedented ceremonies still derive from the underlying principles that inform standard protocol and existing precedents. Written guidelines would not prelude negotiation and agreement to change or modify protocol as required, because those principles still inform decision-makers how to act.

I hope that PCH updates this excellent resource as needed.

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[1] Canada. Department of Canadian Heritage. Ceremonial and Protocol Handbook. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, c. 1998): A.1-1.

Posted in Constitutional Conventions, Officialization of Convention | Tagged , , | 3 Comments

The Parti Quebecois’ Contempt for the Constitution: Limiting the Premier to Two Consecutive “Mandates” in Office


Introduction

Quebec Premier Jean Charest advised the Lieutenant Governor to dissolve the 39th National Assembly on 1 August 2012 so that Quebeckers cast their ballots on 4 September 2012.[1] Charest’s Liberals face Pauline Marois’ Parti Québécois (PQ) and Francois Legault’s Coalition pour l’avenir du Québec (CAQ).

The English-language media has already noted some of the PQ’s anti-constitutional proposal to force potential candidates running for the National Assembly to pass test of their competency in French. While Marois has since withdrawn that proposal, the PQ have maintained another plank of their platform that would probably also be unconstitutional, and the English-language media have yet to report on it.

Two planks of the Parti Quebecois’ (PQ) platform would amount to severe vandalism against the constitution. As of 4 August 2012, the secessionist party’s platform calls for “limiting to two the number of consecutive mandates of a premier” and to “implement fixed-dated elections,” without specifying whether Quebec’s fixed-elections legislation would limit the duration of a National Assembly to three, four, or five years.[2] Both of these proposals are designed to constrain the powers of the Premier, but the term limits in particular would at worst be unconstitutional and at best generate legal-constitutional chaos.

The PQ has already changed the wording of this proposal. The original wording from December 2010 sought “to limit the period during which a person can act as Premier of Quebec to the longer of two mandates or 10 years.”[3] That wording prevailed in January 2011, but by May 2012, PQ had adopted the current wording.[4] More confusing still, Marois removed the “consecutive” from her platform and instead proposed “[to limit] the Premier to two mandates” in the leaders’ debate of 20 August 2012.

The Term of a First Minister and Cabinet vs. the Life of a Parliament

The term of a First Minister and Cabinet on the one hand versus the life of a Parliament on the other shows the truest separation between the executive and legislature under our system of Responsible Government.

The authors of the PQ’s platform fail to understand at least three aspects of our system of Responsible Government and hold these misconceptions: first, that the life of a Parliament also determines the “term” of a government; second, that a First Minister can resign from office and leave the rest of Cabinet intact; third, that the Cabinet derives its power and authorities from Parliament.[5] As such, they equate the “mandate” of the Premier to the life of a parliament in which the Premier’s party commands a plurality or majority of the seats. All are factually incorrect.

First, section 3 of the Constitution Act, 1982 fixes the maximum life of the Parliament of Canada and all ten provincial legislatures at five years. Nowhere, however, do the Constitution Acts limit the tenure of a government. Instead, under the Westminster system of Responsible Government, a Cabinet does not and cannot serve a fixed term; it remains in office as long as the legislature allows through the confidence convention. Its term could be as short as three months or as long as fifteen years. A Ministry can remain in office across the span of more than one Parliament; conversely, one Parliament can support more than one Ministry. There is no fixed ratio or correlation between the number of Parliaments and number of Ministries. At the federal level thus far, Canada has seen 41 Parliaments but only 28 Ministries since Confederation, while the province of Quebec has seen 39 legislatures and 34 Ministries in the same period.[6] The difference between these ratios only signifies that Quebec sees a greater turnover in government than does Canada.

Second, the tenure of the First Minister determines the term in office of his or her Ministry, which means that his or her resignation or death results in the automatic resignation of all other serving Cabinet ministers and the end of that Ministry.[7] Upon the resignation or death of the First Minister, the remaining Ministers of the Crown would then operate as a caretaker cabinet, carrying out only the routine and necessary activity, until the Governor appoints a new First Minister, who in turn forms a new Cabinet.[8]

A First Minister can serve two or more terms if and only if he resigns from office and the Governor subsequently re-appoints him to that office. “Consecutive terms” are therefore impossible, but non-consecutive terms have happened at both the federal level and in Quebec. limiting the Premier to “two mandates” would not limit his tenure to any specific number of years, but tie his tenure directly to the lives of two parliaments, which are subject to the possibility of early dissolution.

The True “Mandate” of the First Minister: Cabinet’s Powers and Authorities Flow from the Crown, Not from Parliament

Third, Cabinet’s powers and authorities derive from the Crown, not from Parliament.[9] The legislature simply determines, via the confidence convention, which party or parties form Cabinet and exercise the powers and authorities of the Crown, and the Governor is obliged to appoint the First Minister accordingly. Contrary to popular and journalistic belief, a single-party minority government, a coalition government, and a single-party majority government all wield precisely the same powers and authorities of the Crown, though some types of government command the confidence of the legislature more easily than others.[10]

The Governor appoints as First Minister the leader of the party who stands the best chance of heading a government that can command the confidence of the legislature, thus granting him official commission under the Crown – the true legal “mandate.”[11] This is the Governor’s first constitutional duty: to ensure that there is always a First Minister and Cabinet in office. The Governor must fill this vacancy immediately whenever a First Minister resigns or dies in office because there must always be a government in order to secure to continuity of the State. The Governor then appoints (and dismisses) other Ministers of the Crown on and in accordance with the advice of the First Minister.[12]

Responsible Government means that the First Minister and Ministers of the Crown take responsibility for all acts of the Crown[13] (policies, expenditure, and decisions), and that they be accountable to the House of Commons and command its confidence. Once the Cabinet has demonstrated that it commands the confidence of the legislature (such as through the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne or on any supply bill), it retains that confidence until the moment that the legislature decides to withdraw it in a subsequent formal vote in the chamber.[14] As such, the Cabinet still carries out all executive functions when the Parliament is adjourned or prorogued. During an election, the legislature is dissolved and thus ceases to exist altogether. While members of the legislature thus lose their offices, Ministers of the Crown in Cabinet retain in office and continue to govern under the “principle of restraint” (or the “caretaker convention”) and carry out only routine and necessary governmental activity until after the results of the election are known. The Cabinet voluntarily refrains from exercising the full scope of its legal authority precisely because there is no House of Commons to hold it to account.[15]

The PQ’s proposal would put this entire arrangement in jeopardy by granting the presidential concept of term limits on a Westminster parliamentary system. The fact that the Cabinet derives its powers and authorities from the Crown makes this whole arrangement possible. If it derived its executive power from Parliament, then the existence of Cabinet would depend on Parliament. But it does not. The existence of the Ministry instead depends upon the First Minister, who receives his official commission from the Governor.

Ministries That Span More Than One Parliament

Prime Minister Harper and his Cabinet form the 28th Ministry. His term of office began when Governor General Michaelle Jean appointed him on 6 February 2006; it will end only upon his resignation (or in the unlikely event that he dies in office). So far, the Harper government’s term in office has lasted five-and-a-half years and has spanned across the 39th, 40th, and 41st Parliaments.

The Lieutenant Governor appointed Charest as Premier of Quebec on 29 April 2003; his government has so far spanned the 37th, 38th, and 39th National Assemblies.

Parliaments That Supported More Than One Ministry

The 2nd Parliament of Canada (1873-1874) supported the First Macdonald Government and the Mackenzie Government. The 7th Parliament of Canada (1891-1896) gave sanction to four governments: the Second Macdonald Government, the Abbot Government, the Thompson Government, and the Bowell Government. (The Tupper Government is a bizarre case, because it existed only during writ period between the 7th and 8th Parliaments and therefore never commanded the confidence of either).

In Quebec, the 35th National Assembly (1994-1998) supported both the Parizeau Government and the Bouchard Government. The 36th National Assembly (1998-2003) saw the Bouchard Government and the Landry Government.

Prime Ministers Who Served Non-Consecutive Terms

As “The Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation” shows, Sir John A. Macdonald served two non-consecutive terms as Prime Minister and formed the 1st and 3rd Ministries of Canada: first, from 1867 to his resignation in 1873; second, from his re-appointment in 1878 to his death in 1891.[16] So far, Macdonald is the only Prime Minister whose Ministry dissolved both upon his resignation and upon his death. The clever Mackenzie King served three terms as Prime Minister: first, from his appointment in 1921 to his veritable dismissal in 1926; second, from his re-appointment later in 1926 to his resignation after electoral defeat in 1930; third, from his re-appointment in 1935 to his voluntary resignation in 1948. King maintains at least two distinctions, being the only Canadian Prime Minister whom a Governor General forced to resign (tantamount to a formal dismissal), and for having served the greatest number of years as Prime Minister during his three terms. Finally, Pierre Trudeau served two terms as Prime Minister: first, from his appointment on 20 April 1968 (in the middle of a parliament) to his resignation upon electoral defeat on 3 June 1979; second, from his re-appointment on 3 March 1980 to his voluntary resignation on 29 February 1984. The First Trudeau Government spanned across the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th Parliaments, while the 32nd Parliament alone contained the Second Trudeau Government.

In Quebec, Maurice Duplessis served two terms as Premier: first, from his appointment in 1936 to his resignation upon electoral defeat in 1939; second, from his re-appointment in 1944 to his death in office in 1959.

Robert Bourassa served two terms as Premier: from his appointment on 12 May 1970 to his resignation after electoral defeat 25 November 1976, and again from his re-appointment on 12 December 1985 to his voluntary resignation on 11 January 1994. Bourassa advised and received the early dissolution after only 3 years of both the 29th National Assembly (1970-1973) and the 30th National Assembly (1973-1976). His second term spanned the 33rd National Assembly (1985-1989) and the 34th National Assembly (1989-1994).

The PQ’s Proposal Is Probably Unconstitutional and Certainly Impracticable

Ambiguity of “Mandate” and the Fixed Elections

Originally, in 2010 and 2011, the PQ proposed to “limit the Premier to the longer of two mandates or ten years.” The PQ also sought to complement the limit of the Premier’s term in office with fixed-elections legislation, but without specifying whether the elections would be fixed every three, four, or five years. First, the PQ also failed to take into account the possibility of a minority parliament, which could trigger an early dissolution at any time by withdrawing confidence in the government. Second, if the fixed elections were required every four years, the Premier and Cabinet would probably not serve a term longer than eight years and two parliaments. In that case, a Premier could only serve “the longer of ten years” if the Lieutenant-Governor appointed him in the middle of the life of an earlier parliament that preceded the other two. Third, if the PQ did not intend to fix the elections every four years (as all the other provinces do) and instead fix them at five, then the entire plan would become wholly redundant: section 4 of the Constitution Act, 1982 already limits the duration of the Parliament of Canada and the provincial assemblies to a maximum of five years!

The PQ now seeks to “limit the Premier to two consecutive mandates.” This proposal would create two different classes of problems, one depending on a majority National Assembly and a single-party majority government, the other on a minority National Assembly and a single-party minority government or a coalition government. In addition, the ambiguity of “mandate” quickly becomes apparent. Whether the PQ would fix elections every four or five years may also depend upon the definition of the ambiguous “mandate” that the Premier possesses.

If “mandate” refers to the “popular mandate” based on results from the general election of a new National Assembly, then such a law would not fix the Premier’s (and therefore the government’s) time in office to a set number of years, but rather to a set number of parliaments. And the life of those parliaments would still remain subject to the confidence convention and the possibility of early dissolution. The PQ could also have meant a “party mandate,” such as when the government changes within the life of a parliament because one First Minister and party leader resigned and was replaced by another. This model would require a majority Parliament and a single-party majority government. This has occurred in Quebec three times in the past 20 years. In 1994, Bourassa resigned, and Daniel Johnson replaced him as both Liberal leader and as Premier; in 1996, Parizeau resigned, and Bouchard replaced him as both PQ leader and Premier; finally, in 2001, Bouchard resigned, and Landry replaced him as both PQ leader and Premier.

Applying the PQ’s Term Limits to the Charest Government

The ambiguity and impracticality of the PQ’s proposal becomes readily apparent when applied to the Charest government, which has spanned two majority parliaments and one minority parliament. The Charest government maintained a majority in the 37th National Assembly (2003-2007), clung to only a plurality in the 38th National Assembly (2007-2008), and subsequently regained its majority in the 39th  National Assembly (2008-2012).

Jean Charest led his Liberal party to a parliamentary majority in the general election of 2003 and replaced Bernard Landry as Premier of Quebec – thus securing what most journalists would call a popular “majority mandate”. However, the election of 2007 reduced the Liberals to a parliamentary plurality, which ensured that Premier Charest led a minority government. That election thus gave Charest only a popular “minority mandate”, since his government managed to retain the confidence of the National Assembly. If the PQ’s absurd proposal had applied to Charest, the law would have forced him to resign as premier upon the dissolution of the 38th National Assembly in 2008 – because he could only serve “two mandates”, which most logically would refer to “the life of two National Assemblies.” As such, the dissolution of the National Assembly that granted the Premier his “mandate” would therefore logically demand the resignation – or dismissal – of the Premier’s Ministry, which would in turn violate a host whole of conventions and practices of Responsible Government.

The resignation of a First Minister in Canada automatically results in the resignation of the entire Cabinet, which means that the Governor would have to appoint a new premier and government tout de suite because his primary duty is to ensure that there is always a government in office. Charest would have been obliged to resign in 2008 after the dissolution of the 38th National Assembly and the dissolution of his “mandate.” The Lieutenant-Governor would in turn have been obliged to appoint a new Premier and government from the same party (presumably on Charest’s advice) – all while the National Assembly itself was dissolved and did not exist. This new Liberal government would then have commanded neither the confidence of the National Assembly (since it did not exist), nor the confidence of the electorate. An entirely new government (another Liberal Ministry) would have presented itself to the people of Quebec in the 39th General Election of 2008. This arrangement would therefore have forced the Lieutenant Governor to intervene such that he would deprive the electorate of the opportunity to hold the Charest government to account. And if Charest did not resign, would the Lieutenant Govrnor then be obliged to formally dismiss him and his government from office? If so, the Lieutenant Governor would then have to appoint a new Premier immediately. And this is supposed to a more democratic? Under minority National Assemblies, the PQ’s proposal would replicate the bizarre case of the Tupper Government of 1896 and force the Lieutenant Governor to appoint a new Premier and new Government during the writ period. All of the above would severely derogate from the principles of Responsible Government and render our system less democratic and less accountable. It would augment the power of the Lieutenant Governor at the expense of the Premier and Cabinet.

Majority Parliaments and the Ambiguity of “Mandate”

Other problems that derive from the ambiguity of “mandate” would arise in a series of majority National Assemblies. If a Premier and his Cabinet are sworn mid-parliament upon the resignation or death of the previous Premier, this new Premier would lack a “popular mandate.” How, then, would the PQ count his “mandates” and limit him and his Cabinet to two of them? Such transfers of power mid-parliamentt have happened numerous times in Quebec. The elections of 1994 gave the PQ a majority in the National Assembly, and Jacques Parizeau became Premier. He resigned on 29 January 1996. Lucien Bouchard was sworn in as Premier on the same day, but he did not advise dissolution until 1998. The PQ secured another parliamentary majority in the 36th National Assembly, but Bouchard resigned as Premier on 8 March 2001. Bernard Landry then formed a new government that lasted until 29 April 2003. The Bouchard government spanned two National Assemblies, but he only secured one “popular mandate.” Would the PQ therefore deem that Bouchard only served one “mandate” as Premier? The Landry formed his government mid-parliament and never led his party to electoral victory. Would the PQ therefore conclude that the Landry government had won zero “mandates” and thus allow him to remain as leader for another two parliaments?

Some federal examples also illustrate the absurdity of the PQ’s proposal. Pierre Trudeau in 1968, John Turner in 1984, Kim Campbell in 1993, and Paul Martin in 2003 were all appointed Prime Minister and invited to form governments mid-parliament based on the results of own parties’ leadership processes. Did any of them possess “mandates” from the start? The Turner and Campbell governments met disastrous defeat in the subsequent campaigns, but the Trudeau and Martin governments remained in office. So perhaps the Turner and Campbell governments served in office but never possessed “mandates.”

The First Trudeau Government and the Martin Government highlight the ambiguity of the “mandate.” The Governor General appointed Trudeau as Prime Minister mid-parliament on 20 April 1968, after he had won the Liberal leadership. Prime Minister Trudeau then advised the dissolution of the 27th Parliament on 23 April 1968. The First Trudeau government increased its parliamentary plurality to a parliamentary majority in the 28th Parliament. Similarly, Paul Martin was appointed Prime Minister on 12 December 2003 because he won the leadership of the Liberal Party, which formed a parliamentary majority in the 37th Parliament. Prime Minister Martin didn’t advise the dissolution of the 37th Parliament until 23 May 2004, after which the Martin government lost its parliamentary but remained in office as a single-party minority government. Would the PQ seriously suggest that the Martin government ruled without a “mandate” for its first six months?

Conclusion

The PQ’s proposal would probably be unconstitutional because it would derogate from the principles of Responsible Government, the confidence convention, and could politicize the Lieutenant Governor by forcing him to her to appoint a new premier and government mid-parliament (sometimes during a minority parliament) or after a parliament has already been dissolved. If implemented, this new law would be ambiguous, undesirable, impracticable, foolish, and probably unconstitutional.

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[1] National Assembly of Quebec, “Dissolution of the Assembly,” 1 August 2012. [accessed 21 August 2012].
[2] Parti québécois, “L’avenir du Québec est entre vos mains : la plateforme électorale du Parti Québécois,” 4 August 2012.
[3] Parti québécois, “Pauline Marois dévoile ses propositions pour l’assainissement des moeurs politiques au Québec,” 14 December 2010.  The original French read : « Limiter à deux mandats ou dix ans, selon la plus longue échéance, la période pendant laquelle une personne peut agir à titre de premier ministre du Québec. »
[4] Parti quebecois, “Limiter le nombre de mandats du premier ministre et des maires : une idée de Pauline Marois qui plaît à aux Québécois,” 26 January 2011; Parti quebecois, “Élection partielle : « Pour changer la politique au Québec, ça commence dans Argenteuil en votant Parti Québécois » – Roland Richer,” 23 May 2012.
[5] I use “First Minister” as the generic form for the federal Prime Minister and provincial Premiers, and “Governor” includes both the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governors.
[6] National Assembly of Quebec, “Dissolution of the Assembly,” 1 August 2012. [accessed 21 August 2012]; Marionapolis College, “Quebec History: Premiers of Quebec,” 13 September 2004 [accessed 23 August 2012].
[7] Canada. Privy Council Office, Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada, Henry F. Davis and André Millar. (Ottawa, Government of Canada, 1968): 77-79.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., 93.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid., 145-146.
[12] Ibid., 329-331.
[13] Sir John George Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed. (Montreal: Dawson Brothers Publishing, 1916): 102.
[14]Peter Neary, “Confidence: How Much Is Enough?” Constitutional Forum constitutionnel 18, no. 1 (2009): 51-54.
[15] Canada. Privy Council Office, Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada, Henry F. Davis and André Millar. (Ottawa, Government of Canada, 1968): 89-91.
[16] Canada. Privy Council Office, “Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation.”

Posted in Appointment of PM, Coalition Government, Confidence Convention, Constitutional Conventions, Crown (Powers and Office), Fixed-Date Elections, Formation of Governments, Governor's Discretion, Parliamentary Privilege, Reaffirmation of, Reform, Responsible Government, Succession (Prime Minister) | Tagged , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Prorogation Should Remain a Prime Ministerial Power


Commanding Confidence is a Binary Proposition: Either the Government Has It, Or It Does Not

R. Michael Warren (a former deputy minister in the civil service of Ontario and therefore former practitioner) argued that Primer McGuinty should have advised the Lieutenant Governor to prorogue the Legislative Assembly of Ontario in order to postpone a vote on confidence on the budget, if he could not gain the support of the New Democrats in time.”[1] Contrary to some scholarly assertions that prorogation “avoids” a vote of confidence, it in fact postpones such votes of confidence until after the intersession and the start of the next session of the legislature. The New Democrats, led by Andrea Horwarth, ended up supporting the McGuinty Government’s budget, so the “abuse of power” (as the political activists characterize prorogation as delay tactic) did not come to pass. Bill 55, An Act to implement Budget measures and to enact and amend various Acts, received Royal Assent on 20 June 2012.

Writing on 18 June 2012, Warren argued that Premier McGuinty could either have advised dissolution or prorogation when his government faced an imminent loss of confidence in the Legislative Assembly. Warren has based his argument on the fact that once Government has demonstrated that it commands the confidence of the legislature (such as through the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne), the Government retains that confidence until the moment the legislature withdraws it in a subsequent formal vote in the chamber. The declarations of an individual Member or of a political party outside the chamber itself do not figure into this calculation, and anyone who argues the contrary (as many did in 2008) would threaten both the confidence convention and parliamentary privilege. An apparent loss of confidence outside the chamber does not constitute a true and valid loss of confidence in the chamber; individual Members or parties could vote differently in the chamber when they must formally confront the consequences of their decision – either dissolution and election or a change in government.

Horwath has put McGuinty in a difficult position. If she is successful in removing arbitration reform from the budget bill in committee, and it comes to the legislature Wednesday for a final vote, McGuinty has three options:

 • He could accept the change and pass the bill with the support of the NDP.
• He could go to the Lieutenant-Governor and ask him to dissolve the [legislature], thus prompting a July election.
• He could ask the Lieutenant-Governor to prorogue the legislature until the fall.

None of these options is particularly attractive but Horwath’s partisan jockeying is forcing McGuinty to choose the least of these three evils.

Political Activism vs. Constitutional Scholarship

One scholar, annoyed with my suggestion that he cannot separate his partisan views from his constitutional assessments, sardonically retorted that I would better appreciate the blending of constitutional scholarship and political activism “when [I] get older.” Another anti-Harper activist angry about the Harper’s prorogation of 2008 called me a “Harper apologist” because I support the constitutionality of prime ministerial control over and responsibility for advice to prorogue parliament. Both accusations are, of course, total nonsense. A serious scholar (as opposed to a political activist) can — and indeed, must — separate his partisanship or ideology from his constitutional interpretations.

Like Warren, I would have supported the constitutionality and propriety of Premier McGuinty’s decision. If he had decided to exercise the prime ministerial prerogative on prorogation or dissolution, the Lieutenant Governor would have had no discretion to reject such advice under the circumstances of the 40th Legislative Assembly of Ontario. And I offer this constitutional assessment as someone who will not vote Liberal in the next provincial election because my support for prime ministerial control over the summoning, prorogation, and dissolution of parliament does not depend on the party or ideology of the government of the day.

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[1] R. Michael Warren, “Ontario budget battle: McGuinty’s best option would be to prorogue the legislature,” Toronto Star, (Monday, 18 June 2012).

Posted in Confidence Convention, Constitutional Conventions, Crown (Powers and Office), Prime Minister's Powers, Prorogation, Reaffirmation of, Responsible Government | Tagged , , , , , | 8 Comments

Your Canada, Your Constitution Denies the Statute of Westminster and Patriation


Introduction

Your Canada, Your Constitution (YCYC) has published the second of what may become a series of installments derived from the unscientific, inaccurate push poll that Harris-Decima conducted on its behalf between May 10th and May 20th. The constitutional sophists at YCYC devised survey questions that contain numerous factual errors, and then erroneously concluded that “52% of Canadians agree Canada’s Constitution should be changed to make Canada fully independent from Britain – 43% disagree.”[1]

The Unscientific Methodology of the Push Poll Invalidates Its Results

YCYC asked respondents whether “Canada [should become] a fully independent country by retiring the British monarchy as the head of governments in Canada.” The question itself contains at least three main errors.

To what extent do you agree or disagree that Canada’s Constitution should be changed to make Canada a fully independent country by retiring the British Monarchy as Head of Canada’s federal and provincial governments?

  1. Strongly agree
  2. Agree
  3. Disagree
  4. Strongly disagree
  5. [Do not read] Don’t know/refused

First, Canada became independent upon the passage of the Statute of Westminster in December 1931. Second, the Patriation of the written constitution in 1982 finally put into effect what the Statute of Westminster had made possible since the 1930s and ensured that only the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures could amend the constitution of Canada. The Statute of Westminster, 1931 marked the formal and legal independence of the Dominion of Canada, but our written constitution remained an act of the British Parliament until Patriation; as such, the British Parliament had to amend Canada’s constitution on the advice of the Canadian Parliament. Canada could have patriated as early as December 1931, but our federal and provincial governments and parliaments could not agree on a suitable amending formula. We decided to leave the amendment of our written constitution to the British Parliament by default, as a neutral position until devising a new indigenous amending formula. Peter Russell offers an excellent history of constitutional reform in 20th-century Canada in Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?

The Statute of Westminster created the personal monarchical union of the Commonwealth Realms and thus established the Crown of Canada and the King or Queen of Canada as a separate legal-constitutional entity relative to the Crown of the United Kingdom and the King or Queen of the United Kingdom. The “British monarch” has not been Canada’s head of state since 1931. There are currently 16 Commonwealth Realms, and this doctrine applies to all of them. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II therefore wears 16 Crowns (in the legal sense) and is separately the Queen of the United Kingdom, the Queen of Canada, the Queen of Australia, the Queen of New Zealand, and the Queen of 12 other Realms. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom advises the Queen in Right of the United Kingdom, while the Prime Minister of Canada advises the Queen in Right of Canada.

This diagram shows how the British Empire gave way to the Commonwealth and made the Dominions independent countries (Tidridge 2011, 47).

The Royal Proclamation that Queen Elizabeth II of Canada signed at the ceremony in Ottawa in recognition of Patriation even declared in the preamble, “Whereas it is in accord with the status of Canada as an independent state that Canadians be able to amend their Constitution in Canada in all respects.”[2] The Queen of Canada thus recognized that Canada had already attained the status of independent state before 1982. The Right Honourable Jean Chretien (then the Attorney General of Canada) and the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, counter-signed the proclamation.

Her Majesty the Queen of Canada, Prime Minister Trudeau, and Attorney General Jean Chretien signed this proclamation of patriation.

Third, the Prime Minister and the Premiers are the heads of government of the federal and provincial governments. The Queen of Canada is Canada’s head of state, and the Governor General represents her and carries out most of her functions in right of Canada. The Governor General of Canada appoints the provincial Lieutenant Governors on and in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. The Crown of Canada thus includes the “compound monarchy”: the Crown in Right of Canada, and the Crown in right of each individual province.

This diagram illustrates David E. Smith’s doctrine of the “compound monarchy” of the Crown of Canada (Tidrigde 2011, 79).

Conclusion

YCYC ought not to operate under the guise of an “educational charity” and simply acknowledge that it seeks to promote, through political activism, the abolition of the Crown of Canada and the creation of the Federal Republic of Canada. By asking the erroneous question of whether Canada should become independent of the United Kingdom, YCYC means, “Should Canada become a republic?” Instead of clearly stating its intentions openly and honestly, YCYC has decided to conceal its anti-monarchism under a veneer of mendacity and constitutional sophistry. This organization does not educate the public; it seeks to sow cynicism toward Canada’s existing institutions in order to make its activism look more credible.

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[1] Your Canada, Your Constitution, “52% of Canadians agree Canada’s Constitution should be changed to make Canada fully independent from Britain – 43% disagree,” 26 June 2012.
[2]
Canada, The Canada Gazette, Part II Constitution Act, 1982: Proclaimed in Force April 17th, 1982” 116, no. 9 (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada), 12 May 1982.

Posted in Articles and Books, Constitution (Written), Crown (Powers and Office), Monarchism v Republicanism, Reviews, The Personal Union | Tagged , , , , , , | 9 Comments

Peter Russell on the Prorogation-Coalition Controversy of 2008


Russell’s Errors of Interpretation on Prorogation

Ontario News Watch uploaded an interview with Peter Russell on 25 June 2012, in which he displayed his unalloyed Forseyite interpretation of the reserve powers. Russell made several demonstrably incorrect assertions throughout the interview, which I shall enumerate below and support with the appropriate scholarship and primary sources, such as the proclamations of prorogation themselves contained in the Canada Gazette.

“Unprecedented” Advice to Prorogue

Russell incorrectly characterized the prorogation of 2008 as “unprecedented.” Canadian historian Barbara Messamore wrote a book on the early Governors General of the United Province of Canada and the Dominion of Canada and thoroughly debunked Russell’s assertion. In “No Discretion: On Prorogation and the Governor General,” Nick MacDonald and I demonstrated that the prorogation of 1873 took place under almost identical circumstances as did the prorogation of 2008: with a government facing imminent defeat in the Commons, the Prime Minister advised the Governor General to prorogue Parliament, and the Governor General did so. As The Globe (a Liberal paper) and the Ottawa Citizen (then a steadfastly Conservative paper) show, Macdonald’s prorogation of 1873 also provoked an enormous public controversy and heated debate for and against his advice. In 1873 as in 2008, critics decried a breach of parliamentary principles and denigration of Responsible Government.

The difference between the two prorogations rests with the response of the House of Commons. Macdonald advised prorogation, which Lord Dufferin formally implemented on 13 August 1873, with a pro forma summoning for “the despatch of business” on 22 September 1873.[1] Macdonald then advised Dufferin to extend the length of the intersession to 23 October 1873, at which point the 2nd Parliament reconvened. In this case, the Commons decided to withdraw its confidence in the Macdonald government after the intersession and despite the prorogation. The first Macdonald ministry resigned on 5 November 1873, and Governor General Lord Dufferin formally appointed Alexander Mackenzie as Prime Minister on 7 November 1873.[2] Alexander Mackenzie then advised Governor General Dufferin to prorogue the 2nd Parliament that same day, and to extend the intersession of the prorogation yet further on 12 December 1873.[3] Finally, he advised dissolution on the 2nd Parliament for 4 January 1874, even though it had sat for only two years.[4]

However, when the 40th Parliament resumed for its 2nd session in January 2009, the Commons saw fit to pass the Harper government’s Keynesian budget and thus maintained its confidence in that Government. The identical inputs of these situations produced divergent outputs, but the House of Commons decided the fate of both the Macdonald government and the Harper government. Therefore, Russell and all those who agree with him should blame the House of Commons and the breakdown of the Liberal-New Democratic “cooperative government” agreement and the second Liberal-New Democratic agreement with the Bloc Québécois[5] – not Prime Minister Harper.

The Meaning of Responsible Government

Russell gave an unbridled, classic recap of Forsey’s interpretation of the reserve powers at 1 minute, 50 seconds:

The power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve Parliament […] are powers of the Crown, which are exercised in Canada by the Governor General. […] There’s no question that the power is hers and hers to use as she sees fit. [The Governor General] has to think what is in the best interest of parliamentary democracy and the well-being of Canadians. […] The Crown has the reserve power […]. It’s a tough call, which lots of arguments on either side of the issue. […] The Crown is our safeguard over our Prime Ministers who might want to ride roughshod over Parliament, ignore its will, not be willing to submit themselves to its judgement. That was the big worry: was this a Prime Minister not willing to submit his government to the judgement of Parliament? [The Governor General] has an important job to project the integrity of parliamentary democracy.  

Russell has omitted the conventional constitution and thus lost sight of the definition of Responsible Government itself. Responsible Government means that “Ministers of the Crown” (the Prime Minister and Cabinet) “take responsibility for all acts of the Crown” (policies, expenditure, decisions).[6] Under Responsible Government, the Sovereign does not act unilaterally and independently, but on the advice of the Prime Minister alone or the Cabinet as a whole and in accordance with that advice, except in extraordinary circumstances where the “reserve powers” may apply.[7] The Government must command the confidence of the Commons, gauged by formal votes in the chamber, in order to govern, though it retains all its formal legal powers and authority when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved.[8] The Government must also command the confidence of the Commons in order that the Governor General act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister to prorogue and dissolve. Notwithstanding the extra-parliamentary declarations of Members, the Harper government had already demonstrated that it possessed the confidence of the 40th Parliament through the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne when Harper advised prorogation on 4 December 2008.[9]

The Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Appeal for Ontario have recognized the validity of the aforesaid interpretation of Responsible Government. In Black v Chretien (2001), the Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled:

By convention, the Governor General exercises her powers on the advice of the Prime Minister or Cabinet. Although the Governor General retains discretion to refuse to follow this advice, in Canada that discretion has been exercised only in the most exceptional circumstances. Still, nothing in the Letters Patent or the case law requires that all prerogative powers by exercised exclusively by the Governor General. As members of the Privy Council, the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Crown may also exercise the Crown prerogative. The reasons of Wilson J. in Operation Dismantle [case of the Supreme Court] affirm that prerogative power may be exercised by cabinet ministers and therefore does not lie exclusively with the Governor General.[10]   

Russell has therefore conflated the discretionary authority of the Sovereign or vice-regal to reject the Prime Minister’s advice under exceptional circumstances (the reserve powers) with the total powers of the Crown as a whole, which Ministers of the Crown routinely exercise in the name of the Queen or Governor General and for which they must take responsibility. Russell also uses “the Crown” to mean “the Governor General”; in reality, even Walter Bagehot, writing in 1867, recognized that “the Crown” consists of the “dignified” function, represented by the Queen or Governor General, and the “efficient” function, carried out by Ministers of the Crown.[11] Where the written constitution declares that the Governor General carries out a function, he does so by convention on and in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. Where the written constitution declares that the Governor-in-Council carries out a function, he does so on and with accordance to the advice of Cabinet. Russell is therefore wrong to assert that “There’s no question that the power [to summon, prorogue, and dissolve] is [the Governor General’s] and hers to use as she sees fit” because the Governor General does not act unilaterally and independently. The Governor General may reject advice, but must always ensure that the government can defend that decision, which is why vice-regal rejection of constitutional advice to prorogue or dissolve parliament would require the Governor General to dismiss the Prime Minister and government whose advice he rejected and appoint another. Just as the Governor General cannot dissolve parliament unilaterally, he cannot prorogue it unilaterally.

Procedure of Prorogation and the Duration of the Intersession

Russell ignores the written constitution’s limit on the duration of an intersession and ignores the proclamations on pro forma summoning. At 5 minutes and 5 seconds, he argues that the Governor General would “be bound to refuse [advice to prorogue]” under certain conditions. “One would be proroguing Parliament for an indefinite period or for months.”

Nick MacDonald and I already thoroughly debunked this spurious claim in our article, “No Discretion: On Prorogation and the Governor General,” but I will cite the relevant passage here.

[A] government in fact cannot indefinitely avoid or postpone a vote of non-confidence via prorogation, because it necessarily results in a new session of parliament, which in turn necessitates a new Speech from the Throne. The Address in Reply of the Speech from the Throne marks the first vote of confidence of any session, and parliament must debate this before conducting other business. The opposition can vote against this and thus defeat the government. The government can therefore only invoke prorogation once before the House of Commons could withdraw its confidence. In addition, the Constitution Act, 1982 requires that parliament meet at least once annually. Parliament must convene in order, at the very least, to pass supply in the form of the budget and estimates; the bills associated with supply constitute votes of confidence on which the government cannot evade parliament’s will.[12]

The documents in the first section show that each proclamation of prorogation (or before 1982, each Throne Speech than ended a session) and each proclamation of dissolution also entail a “pro forma summoning” of the next session or next Parliament. The Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada, which Russell consciously dismisses and ignores despite its accurate descriptions of historical practice, explains this tradition and accounts for the proclamations extending the prorogations of 1873, which I included earlier in this column.

It is customary for a parliament to be always on summons, so Parliament must be prorogued to a specific date, even if there is no intention of convening it on that day. Historically, if no date for meeting is selected, it was customary to prorogue it pro forma for 40 days. The period of prorogation could be extended by proclamations for periods of 40 days.  The 40-day custom is based on the Magna Carta of King John, which agreed to give a minimum of 40 days’ notice for the summoning of Parliament.[13]   

The Canada Gazette contains the proclamations of prorogation, which also include the proclamation for the pro forma summoning of the next session of parliament. The prorogation of 4 December 2008 consisted of a “Proclamation Proroguing Parliament to 26 January 2009” as well as a “Proclamation Summoning Parliament to Meet on 26 January 2009,” both of which the Governor General issued “by and with the advice and consent of the Prime Minister of Canada.”[14] This wording demonstrates that contrary to Russell’s implication, the Governor General does not prorogue unilaterally and independently. The same applies to the prorogation of 2009.

Russell’s Dismissal of the Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada

Russell again consciously dismissed the Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada and pretended that it does not exist. Russell most certainly knows about the Manual because MacDonald and I once showed him a complete copy. Where Forsey described the reserve powers as “the last bulwark against prime ministerial absolutism,”[15] Russell described their raison d’etre as the “protect[ion] of our democracy.” He lamented, “I wish some of the principles governing their use were better set out in writing and available to the people and the media and the politicians – and agreed upon by the politicians […] We’re working on that – it’s a work in progress.”

Russell dismisses this cabinet handbook and its officialization of constitutional convention because it contradicts all his writings and assertions since the prorogation of 2008. For instance, the Manual states, “The Governor General does not retain any discretion in the matter of summoning or proroguing Parliament, but acts directly on the advice of the Prime Minister.”[16] However, the governor general can reject advice to dissolve under “those rare and almost indefinable circumstances when it is necessary for the protection of the constitution”.[17]

Activism vs Scholarship: Coalition of 2008

Russell was right on some key points, such as the constitutionality of coalition governments, and criticized “the government’s propaganda” with respect to the coalition agreements. He also confirmed that the Conservatives negotiated with the Liberals in order to secure passage of the budget in January 2009.

Like so many other scholars in the wake of the Prorogation of 2008, Russell has descended into anti-Conservative and anti-Harper political activism, which he insists on portraying as genuine constitutional scholarship. He characterized some unnamed ministers in the Harper government as “disgusting rather than ignorant” for having portrayed the proposed coalition as an unconstitutional coup d’état. He added,

[the Harper government] did two things which I think are disgusting – and I’ll use that word: one is misleading the people that there’s some rule that you can’t have a coalition unless it’s put before the public prior to the election – that’s absolutely BS, and there’s no parliamentary democracy in the world that has any such rule. […] [The Harper government] was also disgusting in that it treated the Bloc Québécois […] as an illegitimate group of MPs whose support for that [proposed coalition] government made it illegitimate […] because their long-term political program was an independent Quebec.

Obviously, coalition governments are not illegal or unconstitutional (contrary to some of the Harper government’s rhetoric), though I would argue that they are undesirable. And the proposed Liberal-New Democratic government certainly did not qualify as a coup d’état, contary to the most absurd and hyperbolic Conservative claims. The mendacity of the coalition-prorogation crisis knew no bounds and certainly did not apply exclusively to the Conservatives. In his memoirs, Brian Topp revealed that before Dion, Layton, and Duceppe held their joint press conference, he had identified on 30 November 2008 the possibility that the “Tories [would] prorogue to January” as a “short-term risk” to the fledging coalition.[18] Topp also acknowledged that he knew of “a manual drafted in the 1960s by the Privy Council Office […] that directs the governor general to grant a prorogation of the house to the prime minister, unconditionally and in every case.”[19] Topp served as one of the New Democrats’ chief negotiators and political operators; if he considered prorogation a legitimate delay tactic on 30 November 2008, then the New Democrats should not have question the constitutional legitimacy of Harper’s advice to prorogue. Of course, political parties operate under politicians’ logic and must shore up their respective bases of support, whether with integrity, or more likely, through the official mendacity and soft deception that so often characterize politics.

In addition, the evidence also leads to the conclusion that coalition governments do not form part of Canada’s political-cultural norms, and norms matter in a country that operates under a hybridized written-conventional constitution. Of the 41 Parliaments of Canada, 11 have been minority parliaments. All 11 supported single-party minority governments, sometimes with general support from an opposition party (as the New Democrats supported Pearson’s and Trudeau’s minorities) but never in formal coalition government, which means that the Prime Minister nominates Ministers of the Crown from more than one political party.[20] In fact, I would argue that the Conservatives’ and Harper government’s mendacity on the illegality of coalition government so resonated with the Canadian electorate and succeeded in shifting public opinion precisely because coalitions do not figure into our federal political norms.

The only coalition government at the federal level consisted of Robert Borden’s Conservatives and most English-speaking Liberals and governed from 1917 to 1920 through two majority parliaments; even Russell himself has acknowledged this fact.[21] This Unionist government formed in order to help better manage Canada’s war effort in Europe. The Cabinet itself consisted of 15 Conservatives, 9 Liberals, and 1 Labourite, which the Governor General appointed on 12 October 1917.[22] Most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the Liberals and Conservatives adopted the platform of the Unionist Coalition Government, led by Prime Minister Robert Borden, and thus campaigned in the election of 17 December 1917 as a coalition.[23] Therefore, contrary to Russell’s assertions, the proposed Liberal-New Democratic coalition of 2008 was the only “unprecedented” element of the prorogation-coalition controversy because the parties did not campaign in the 40th general election as a coalition. Finally, if anyone wants to argue that national emergencies warrant coalition governments, then I must point out that the scale of crisis that the recession of 2008 posed does not even come close to the futile carnage of the First World War.

Unfortunately, I suspect that to the extent that media outlets pay this interview any attention, they will proclaim Russell’s words gospel, shun any critical examination of his assertions, and gloss over the factual errors.

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[1] Canada, The Canada Gazette, “Proclamation” for the Despatch of Business (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 22 September 1873): 470-471.
[2]
Canada, Privy Council Office, “First Ministry” and “Second Ministry,” Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation. [accessed 25 June 2012]
[3]
Canada, The Canada Gazette, “7th November, 1873: Chamber of the Senate, [Governor General’s] Speech,” no. 10, volume VII (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 8 November 1873): 531; Canada, The Canada Gazette, “Proclamation,” no. 10, volume VII (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 13 December 1873).
[4]
Canada, The Canada Gazette, “Proclamations,” no. 27, volume VII (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 3 January 1873). This packet includes the proclamation dissolving the 2nd Parliament, the issuing of the writs of the 3rd general election, and a pro forma summoning of the 3rd Parliament.
[5]
The Liberals and New Democrats would have based their coalition government on “An Accord on a Cooperative Government to Address the Present Economic Crisis.” In turn, the Bloc pledged to provide the necessary parliamentary support of the Liberal-New Democratic coalition until June 2011 in “A Policy Accord to Address the Present Economic Crisis.
[6]
Sir John George Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice, 4th ed. (Montreal: Dawson Brothers Publishing, 1916): 102.
[7]
Black v Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 199 D.L.R.
[8]
Canada. Privy Council Office, Guidelines on the Conduct of Ministers, Secretaries of State, Exempt Staff and Public Servants During An Election. (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2008): 1.
[9]
Nicholas A. MacDonald and James W.J. Bowden, “No Discretion: On Prorogation and the Governor General,” 34, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 7-16.
[10]
Black v Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 199 D.L.R., para. 31-32.
[11]
Walter Bagehot. The English Constitution. 2nd Ed. 1873.  http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/bagehot/constitution.pdf
[12]
Nicholas A. MacDonald and James W.J. Bowden, “No Discretion: On Prorogation and the Governor General,” 34, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 14.
[13]
Canada. Privy Council Office, Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada, Henry F. Davis and André Millar.(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1968): 403.
[14]
Canada, Canada Gazette, Part II, Proclamation Proroguing Parliament to 26 January 2009” (Ottawa, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 4 December 2008).
[15]
Eugene Forsey, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth (Oxford University Press, 1968): 259.
[16]
Canada. Privy Council Office, Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada, Henry F. Davis and André Millar. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1968):,149.
[17]
Ibid., 408-409.
[18]
Brian Topp, How We Almost Gave The Tories The Boot: The Inside Story Behind the Coalition (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd, 2010): 118, 122.
[19]
Ibid., 156.
[20]
Peter Russell. Two Cheers for Minority Government: The Evolution of Canadian Parliamentary Democracy. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008): 8-10.
[21]
Ibid., 10. “‘COAL’ refers to the one and only coalition government Canada has had at the federal level.”
[22]
Canada, Privy Council Office, “Tenth Ministry,” Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation. [accessed 25 June 2012]
[23]
The Globe, “Working Out the Details for Election New Interests: Understanding Reached Is There Shall Be No Distinction Between Liberal and Conservative Candidates Supporting the Union Government,” 13 October 1917, page 3.

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